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One of the key principles of law allowing for the development and consequent enforcement of EU law in the past decades is the right to an effective judicial remedy. This working paper summarises its effects, outlines its main sources, its scope of protection, its limits and some future challenges to its application within the EU's complex system of implementation of EU law. The special difficulties for a system of remedies arises from the parallel existence of implementation of EU law by Member States bodies mostly undertaken in horizontal cooperation with other Member States and vertically with EU institutions bodies and agencies. This cooperation is often highly proceduralised which makes it challenging to identify responsibilities and thus allocate remedies.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that in the absence of judicial remedies on the Union level, it is for the Member States to establish a sufficiently complete 'system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection' of Union law. 1 One of the key principles in the context of the protection of rights against public actors has been the right to an effective judicial remedy. 2 The latter is not only a General Principle of EU law, requiring that rights arising from EU law, be 'effectively protected in each case ', 3 it is also explicitly recognised in 18 . Understood in that sense, Article 47 CFR requires a broad interpretation of Article 51(1) CFR. However, the right to an effective judicial remedy is also, next to its recognition under Article 47 CFR recognised as General Principle of EU law (Article 6(3) TEU), the application of which to Member States is limited by the case law and is not subject to Article 51 CFR.
'effective remedy before a tribunal'. Member States are bound by it when implementing EU law and when acting within its scope. 4 Accordingly, Member States are obliged to ensure that their courts provide 'direct and immediate protection' of rights arising from the Union legal order, 5 and national procedural and substantive rules which have an actual or potential effect on the existence, degree and enforceability of remedies to enforce rights arising from EU law comply with EU law requirements. 6 In short, the CJEU requires that where there is a right under Union law, Member States should offer a remedy to ensure its enforcement (ubi ius ibi remedium) 'both in law and in practice.'
7
Implementation of EU law, however, is less clearly structured according to Member State or EU-levels. In fact, although organisationally separate, actors from different levels often conduct procedures in close cooperation making the protection of rights arising under EU law in this context is an ever more challenging task. The aim of this paper is to explore in this context, whether and how the right to an effective judicial remedy, which has had a profound influence on the development of the EU-specific system of remedies, needs to be adaptation to the changing conditions of implementation of EU law marked by an ever closer cooperation of the executive branches of power on the EU level and the levels of the Member States. In order to do so, this paper adopts a classic legal approach by exploring first the scope of protection offered to individuals by the right to an effective remedy in the different constellations of a final act implementing EU being issued by an institution body or agency of the EU or of the Member States as well as in the context of disputes between individuals. The paper then looks at accepted limitations of the right before deducting from this screening exercise where problems of effective judicial protection can be located in today's system of implementation of EU law in relation to the reality of highly integrated implementation procedures. those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute, such as guarantees against removal from office'. 16 Impartiality further requires that judges act with a degree of objectivity which requires 'the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict application of the rule of law do not have any specific interest in the outcome of the procedure'.
17
Applying these conditions of review to acts adopted to implement EU law has led to groups of cases I would summarise under three different sub-categories: Disputes about acts adopted by EU institutions bodies and agencies; disputes about implementing acts by Member States; and finally disputes arising between individuals in which EU law or rights resulting from EU law might be decisive for the outcome of the dispute.
A EU-level implementation
Where legal protection is required on the EU level, the CJ has rather apodictically stated that the Treaties have 'created a complete system of legal remedies'. In ARE on the other hand, an association of small businesses and former land owners, despite having had actively participated in a formal investigation, could not show to be individually concerned due to the competitive situation they were in. The Court found that a very large amount of competitors, in fact, 'all farmers in the EU' could be regarded The "effectiveness" of a "remedy" within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the "authority" referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so. In order to be effective, the remedy required by Article 13 must be available in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the It held that 'although it remains possible for national law to define the criteria relating to the nature or degree of the infringement which must be met before State liability can be incurred for an infringement of Community law,' 'under no circumstances may such criteria impose requirements stricter than that of a manifest infringement of the applicable law, as set out in paragraphs 53 to 56 of the Also questions of jurisdiction of national courts in civil disputes will be assessed in view of the right to an effective judicial remedy. 64 In that context, Member States tribunals are specifically under the obligation to avoid situations of denial of justice in cases of rights under EU law. 65 As a consequence, national judges in on-going procedures may be obliged to raise issues of EU law on their own motion (ex officio). This may be necessary to ensure that a remedy before a national tribunal for breach of EU law is actually effective. It is most frequently but not exclusively a question arising in disputes between individuals. Under the principle of equivalence, a Member State court will be obliged to apply EU law by its own motion, if it would be obliged to do so also with regard to national provisions. 66 Whether the conditions of equivalence exist is assessed on a case procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances.' 68 Where a national court is bound by the pleadings of the parties as to the type of relief and the remedies, but not as to the law applicable to the case, it might therefore be obliged to apply EU law on its own motion. 69 In that regard, the Court 77 In that case, the UK had implemented a directive on compensation of victims' damage or injury caused by unidentified or insufficiently insured vehicles in traffic accidents by delegating the assessment of damages to an agency against which appeal to an independent arbitrator was possible and whose award was subject, on limited grounds only, to review a national Court. The Court of Justice was satisfied that those arrangements did not 'render it practically impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the right to compensation.' 
